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PUMOMIG project 
 
The imaginary invasion: as the discourse on the “refugee crisis” has impacted on Italian 
politics and society  
 
1. The context: immigration in an historical country of emigration 
 
Italy has been a reception country for international immigrants for only thirty years, like the other 
countries of Southern Europe. This important transformation has occurred mainly in spontaneous and 
informal ways, driven by the labour market, ethnic networks and civil society. National policies have 
mainly followed the process, trying to give a legal framework to the practical inclusion of foreign 
citizens in the economic system and local societies. Despite the approval of several laws, the main 
pillar of Italian immigration policies has been the amnesties for irregular immigrants and their 
employers: seven in 25 years, to mention only the most important and explicit measures, beyond other 
minor or hidden regularizations (Ambrosini 2018). The four amnesties enacted between 1986 and 
1998 regularized the positions of 790,000 immigrants; the amnesty of 2002, following approval of 
the Bossi/Fini Law, regularized 630,000 immigrants. In 2009, the Maroni Law, which applied only 
to the domestic and care sector, prompted nearly 300,000 applications for regularization. In 2012, 
during a profound economic crisis, the Monti government enacted another amnesty; although it fell 
short of expectations, this amnesty yielded approximately 120,000 new regularizations. To be stressed 
is that Italian amnesties are conceived as the granting of permission to employers to legalise workers 
previously hired in informal ways. This means that behind every legalized immigrant there is an 
employer, and in the overwhelming majority of cases, it is an Italian one.  
Family reunifications followed, and they have triggered the formation of a second and even a third 
generation of people of immigrant origin. In total, at present there are about 5.3 million foreign 
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nationals regularly residing in Italy.  They are mainly women (52.0 percent), mainly Europeans (50.9 
percent, and 30.4 percent are EU citizens) (IDOS 2018), and they come mainly from countries with 
a Christian religious tradition (57.5 according to estimates, in comparison with 28.2 percent of 
Muslims) (Caritas-Migrantes 2018) (Table 1). Furthermore, the numbers have been stable in past four 
years. In previous years, arrived immigrants found informal jobs, and sooner or later reached a 
possibility of regularization; however, the lack of job opportunities, even in the informal economy, 
has heavily impacted on the new flows in recent years.  
Statistical data do not confirm what most Italians have believed in recent years: that the country has 
been invaded, that the immigrants arriving are overwhelmingly African males and Muslims, and that 
they primarily arrive by sea to apply for asylum (Allievi and Dalla Zuanna 2016).  
Moreover, despite the obstacles created by the citizenship code (see below), the number of 
naturalizations has rapidly increased in recent years: 129,887 in 2014, 178,035 in 2015, 201,591 in 
2016. 
 
 
Tab. 1. The composition of the immigrant population in Italy (2017): the ten main nationalities 
 Rank Country Residents 
(in thousands) 
% of the 
immigrant 
population 
1 Romania 1,190 23.1 
2 Albania 440 8.6 
3 Morocco 417 8.1 
4 China 291 5.7 
5 Ukraine 237 4.6 
6 Philippines 168 3.3 
7 India 152 3.0 
8 Bangladesh 132 2.6 
9 Moldova 132 2.6 
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10 Egypt 120 2.3 
Source: IDOS, Dossier statistico immigrazione 2018 
 
The economic insertion of immigrants is the crucial aspect of the settlement of the immigrant 
population in Italy. Despite the country’s economic difficulties, the long recession of the period 2008-
2014 and the weak recovery of recent years, 2.4 million immigrants have regular jobs. They represent 
10.5 percent of total employment, with a remarkable concentration in some sectors: 16.6% in the 
construction industry, 16.9% in agriculture, 18.5% in hotels and restaurants, reaching the peak in 
domestic services: 71% (Ministero del Lavoro 2018).   
In comparison with North-Western Europe, the unemployment rate is lower, but the quality of jobs 
is worse (Fullin and Reyneri 2011). Only a few immigrants obtain white-collar jobs, also because of 
the barriers against their insertion in public employment and the scant recognition of their 
qualifications.  
The possibility of self-employment, which has grown also during the recession, now reaching the 
volume of almost 600,000 people involved, 9.4% of the total, is relatively more accessible. For 
instance, at present about half of the street vendors in Italy were born abroad (IDOS 2018). 
While the economic insertion and settlement of immigrant families have largely occurred, the 
political acceptance of this demographic and social change has always been difficult. The citizenship 
law is clear testimony to  this difficulty. It was approved almost unanimously by Parliament in 1992, 
at a time when immigration to Italy began to increase on a large scale, and it was intended to maintain 
a strong link between citizenship and Italian descent: it enables the grandchildren of former Italian 
emigrants to maintain or to acquire citizenship, and remains very strict towards non-EU foreigners 
who want to access Italian citizenship. The law requires 10 years of residence; processing time can 
take up to four years (following a recent disposition of the new government). 
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In contrast, becoming Italian by marriage is easier than in most other developed countries, which is 
why, until some years ago, the majority of naturalizations were awarded following a marriage. 
Zincone (2006) cites a “familial” concept of citizenship. 
The right to vote has shared more or less the same fate. Since the national elections of 2006, Italian 
emigrants have been able to vote without returning to Italy, and to elect members of Parliament to 
represent them; by contrast, long-term foreign immigrant residents have not yet gained the right to 
vote in local elections.   
Furthermore, Italy hosts one of the oldest and strongest anti-immigrant parties, the (Northern) League, 
which in the past was a strategic partner of centre-right governments headed by Mr. Berlusconi, 
holding from 2008 to 2011 the Ministry of Home Affairs.  As we will see, this party occupies a 
leading position in definition of the migration policies of the present government, again holding the 
Ministry of Home Affairs. 
 
2. The “refugee crisis” in Italy 
 
It is necessary to specify that the maritime borders were never the main gateways for immigrants into 
Italy. Most of them entered in regular ways, mainly with tourist visas if necessary, then overstayed, 
especially if they found a job in the hidden economy. The length of Italian coasts, contrary to popular 
wisdom, is not the main reason for the formation of an irregular immigrant population in Italy. The 
labour market and the labour demand by Italian households have been much more important 
(Ambrosini 2018). 
It is true, however, that in recent decades Italy has also been the gateway to Europe for inflows of 
asylum seekers and other kinds of immigrants arriving on its shores from the South of the 
Mediterranean Sea. The so-called ‘North Africa Emergency’ (Emergenza Nord Africa) in 2011, when 
more than 62,000 boat people from African countries arrived in Italy by sea, was a turning point in 
public discourse. Mass-media, public opinion, governments in office and political forces began to 
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emphasize landings as the source of immigration. They interchanged the terms “migrants” and 
“asylum seekers”, so that it was believed that people arriving by sea wanted to settle in Italy. A deep 
divergence between perception and statistical evidence has marked the Italian debate on immigration 
and asylum in recent years. 
As already stated, in that past four years the volume of foreign population in Italy has been stable 
overall, and (the few) new entries from non-EU countries for familial reasons have always 
outnumbered entries for asylum (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Residence permits granted to non-EU citizens in Italy (percentages,  2015-2017) 
Reasons 2015 2016 2017 
Family reasons 43.7 45.8 44.3 
Work 6.3 4.3 3.2 
Asylum, humanitarian reasons 27.3 34.3 38.3 
Other reasons 22.7 15.6 14.2 
Total (in thousands) 226 227 263 
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs  
 
A research institute (Istituto Cattaneo of Bologna), drawing on data from Eurobarometer, shows that 
EU citizens in general overestimate the rate of non-EU citizens living in their country (16.7 per cent 
against 7.2). In the Italian case, however, the gap between perception and reality is much wider, the 
highest indeed among all the countries of the EU, with a perception of 25 per cent against a data of 7 
per cent.1 
It is not only a problem of inaccurate information or the lack of it. The Istituto Cattaneo also takes 
into consideration the “NIM index”, elaborated by the Pew Research Centre and measuring the 
hostility against immigrants and religious minorities. Also in this case, Italy occupies the leading 
position among 13 countries of the “old” EU. Furthermore, the two indicators are related: those with 
                                                          
1 https://www.cattaneo.org/2018/08/27/immigrazione-in-italia-tra-realta-e-percezione/. Accessed on 13 December 2018. 
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a hostile attitude towards migration tend to overestimate the number of immigrants. This does not 
come as a surprise, but what is striking is that in Italy this way of thinking has become the 
conventional wisdom and the hegemonic narrative, also in the mass media, in culture and politics. 
The chapter by Van Hootegem and Meuleman (this book) confirms the rapid rise of a hostile attitude 
among Italian citizens. 
In fact, the number of people rescued at sea is not only less than imagined, but most of them until 
2015 preferred to continue their journey towards Northern Europe by crossing the Alps as well. Thus, 
the implicit role of Italy was that of a bridge, favouring their passage and not strongly enforcing the 
Dublin rules on asylum seekers’ identification at the arrival point. Only a minority of people landing 
in Italy claimed asylum in the country and, therefore, there was a gap between the number of landings 
in Italy and that of applications for asylum. 
In 2015, however, the EU partners imposed the establishment of the so-called “hotspots” on Italian 
soil and made clear that the fingerprints of asylum seekers had to be taken immediately, even against 
their will. The European agreement envisaged also the resettlement of asylum seekers in other 
countries, fixing precise national quotas; but the national governments of other EU countries, 
explicitly or implicitly, rejected enforcement of that agreement, or its application was slowed down. 
Only about 13,000 asylum seekers were relocated, and in the end, the project was abandoned.  
Consequently, the rate of applications for asylum in Italy on the total number of landings has rapidly 
increased, rising from 37 per cent in 2014 to 56 per cent in 2015, to 68 per cent in 2016. In 2017, it 
surpassed 100 per cent, because of arrivals by land through North-Eastern borders and rejections of 
people to Italy as the first country of arrival, according to the Dublin conventions. 
Then the number of asylum seekers hosted in Italy grew until July 2017 (Fig. 1), when the government 
(centre-left coalition, headed by Mr. Gentiloni, with Mr. Minniti Minister of Home Affairs) signed 
new agreements with the Libyan government and local forces and began to hinder the operations of 
search and rescue by NGOs’ ships. The consequence was a sharp reduction of new inflows from the 
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Libyan coasts. Most asylum seekers were blocked or intercepted by the Libyan navy, and held in 
detention centres where there was a stark absence of international control.  
At the end of 2017, the number of arrivals by sea dropped to 119,310 (Fig.1), as a composition 
between a first period, until July, much more intense, and a second period, after July, much more 
scarce. 
In 2018 the new government (Five Stars Movement and League, with Mr. Salvini, League, minister 
of Home Affairs) had from the beginning a hostile attitude towards asylum seekers, immigrants and 
NGOs rescuing people in the Mediterranean (see the following section). As a consequence, the 
number of people arriving by sea dropped dramatically in 2018: 23,370, less than in Spain or Greece. 
 
Fig.1. Asylum seekers in Italy (applications), 2013-2017. Source: Italian Ministry of Home Affairs. 
 
Over the years, the recognition rate of a legal form of protection has decreased, from about 60 per 
cent in 2014 to 41.5 per cent in 2015, 39.4 per cent in 2016, with a slight recovery in 2017: 40.0 per 
cent. Some other asylum applicants received protection after appealing against the negative refugee 
decision: there are no official data, but some estimates claim that about 50 per cent of appeals succeed.  
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Overall, Italy is less generous than the other main Western European countries, with the exception of 
France. The rate of recognition in 2017 was 64.6 in Belgium, 53.0 per cent in Germany, 46.9 in 
Sweden (AIDA 2018).  
Moreover, in Italy the most common formula adopted to grant legal status to asylum seekers is 
“humanitarian protection”, the weakest and temporary form of asylum. Only 5.0 percent of applicants 
in 2015, 5.3 per cent in 2016, 8.4 per cent in 2017 received full refugee status; 14.4 per cent (2015); 
14.1 per cent (2016); 8.4 per cent (2017) obtained subsidiary protection; 22.2 per cent (2015), 20.8 
per cent (2016); 24.7 per cent (2017) humanitarian protection (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig.2: Outcome of asylum applications in Italy: 2010-2017. Source: Italian Ministry of Home Affairs. 
 
The new government, furthermore, has abolished “humanitarian protection”.  Only a few special 
cases will be admitted (people with serious diseases, victims of natural disasters or people who have 
performed “acts of exceptional civic value”).   The estimate is that among the 150,000 applicants 
under examination, about 100-120,000 will be rejected. Since the capacity to repatriate them is very 
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low, the huge majority will remain in Italy, without the possibility of working legally or finding 
accommodation, thus raising fears and hostility among the native population. 
The overwhelming majority of asylum seekers are men; women represented only 16.2 per cent in 
2017, even if there was an increase from 15.0 per cent in 2016, 11.5 per cent in 2015 and 7.7 per cent 
in 2014. The three main countries of origin in 2016 were: Nigeria (27,289 applications), Pakistan 
(13,660) and Gambia (9,040); in 2017 Nigeria was again in the first position (25,964), but followed 
by Bangladesh (12,731) and Pakistan (9,728). For 2018, the Ministry of Home Affairs has provided 
only the number of people landed in Italy by sea. With much reduced numbers, the ranking is now: 
Tunisia (5,181), Eritrea (3,320), and Iraq (1,744). 
In dealing with this unexpected inflow, the Italian authorities have mainly adopted an emergency 
approach. While a national system of reception, SPRAR (Protection System for Asylum Seekers and 
Refugees), has been in place since 2003, the emergency has always been the prevailing frame of 
management of asylum issues. In accordance with this logic, a leading role has been allocated to the 
Civil Protection system in the management of the so-called ‘North-African Emergency’ (2011-2013). 
The 170.000 asylum-seekers disembarked on Italian shores in 2014 led to an Agreement among State, 
Regions and Local Authorities (Accordo conferenza Unificata, 10 July 20142) and to the approval of 
a law (Legislative degree no.142/2015)3 which tried (not always successfully) to overcome the 
emergency logic hitherto dominant. The two main issues were: reaching, through a quota system, a 
homogeneous distribution of asylum-seekers in all the regions (until 2014 there were huge imbalances 
and 70% of asylum-seekers were hosted in three Southern regions, i.e. Sicily, Apulia and Calabria) 
and achieving an effective institutional cooperation among different levels of government. 
                                                          
2 http://www.prefettura.it/FILES/AllegatiPag/1247/Accordo%20Conferenza%20Unificata.pdf, accessed on 28 of 
December 2018. 
3 Most Italian legislation on asylum originates from the transposition of EU directives. Legislative decree no.142/2015 
is not an exception, since it implements directives 2013/32 and 2013/33.  
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The second point includes the designing of a reception system where the national level assumes the 
role of coordinator (Campomori 2018). This system consists of two phases: from first aid to a second 
level of welcome and integration (the SPRAR,), which should have become the mainstream for all 
the asylum-seekers. Local authorities play a crucial role in the institution of a SPRAR project because 
they are requested - on a voluntary basis - to launch the reception project in collaboration with NGOs 
and associations. The Home Affairs Ministry has encouraged implementation of the SPRAR, which 
is conceived as a structured means to achieve a widespread reception, overcoming extraordinary 
solutions, and taking into account, at the same time, diverse local situations, avoiding imbalances and 
non-homogeneous distributions. The resistance of local authorities, however, has led to a lack of 
reception facilities, and a concentration in Southern regions. Only 35,881 places are provided (July 
2018), since only 1,825  municipalities out of more than 8,000 have agreed to take part in the system.4 
Furthermore, almost half of the places are located in Southern regions and Latium, where local 
authorities more clearly perceive the benefits of hosting asylum seekers, in terms of job creation and 
stimulus for the area’s economic system. The richer regions, in which the possibility of refugees’ 
employment should in theory be higher, are less willing to cooperate. In recent years, only refugees 
who have received legal protection (but not all of them), unaccompanied minors, families, and frail 
people are hosted in the SPRAR system.  
The government has responded to this lack of reception facilities by creating a parallel system based 
on the Centres of Extraordinary Reception (CAS): again an emergency response to a recurrent 
structural problem. Indeed, the huge majority of asylum seekers have been hosted in the CAS. In this 
case, the national authorities by-pass local governments by assigning to private actors (mainly, but 
not only, NGOs: also hotel owners and other conventional employers) the task of establishing and 
managing various kinds of reception facilities: often large, with large numbers of guests, and with 
uneven levels of professional competence, experience in and commitment to the integration of hosted 
                                                          
4 https://www.sprar.it/i-numeri-dello-sprar, accessed on 20 December 2018.  
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people, relations with the territory and its services.5 In some cases, the infiltration by criminal 
organizations has been identified, while in others unscrupulous providers have been detected, 
discrediting the whole system of reception. 
The number of asylum seekers hosted in reception facilities was 138,858 at the end of 2018, and their 
distribution across the country, mainly through the CAS system, is related to the population of Italian 
regions: Lombardy, the largest Italian region, hosts 14 per cent of asylum seekers; Latium and 
Campania 9 per cent; Emilia-Romagna, Sicily and Piedmont 8 per cent.6 
The new government recently decided to exclude asylum seekers from the SPRAR, hosting them only 
in the CAS. In these centres furthermore several services have been cancelled (psychological and 
medical assistance, Italian lessons, orientation to the labour market) because the daily rate paid to the 
managing institutions has been reduced from 35 to about 20 euros. The underlying logic is that most 
applications for asylum will be rejected under the new legal regime, so that it is pointless to invest 
money to teach Italian or to insert into the labour market people who will not be authorized to reside 
and work in Italy. 
3. The anti-refugees wave in Italian politics 
 
As widely recognized, the asylum/immigration issue played a major role in the last Italian general 
elections (March 2018), contributing to the collapse of the Democratic Party and to the victory of the 
anti-establishment parties, Five Stars Movement and the League. In May 2018, they signed an 
agreement and established the new government. For the first time in Western Europe, the so-called 
‘populist’ parties won a democratic election and achieved political power at the national level. 
                                                          
5 Conversation with Chiara Marchetti, researcher and expert on asylum seekers’ reception 
6 http://www.interno.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/dati-e-statistiche/sbarchi-e-accoglienza-dei-migranti-tutti-i-dati. Accessed on 
2 January 2019. 
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To understand this dramatic change, it is necessary to observe that, according to Amnesty 
International Italy (2018), hate speech has invaded the information system (newspapers, TVs, social 
media) with growing force, raising arguments that are “openly racist and discriminatory” (p. 2).  In 
Italy hate speech, in particular against asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants in general, is not 
limited to marginal groups of the far right or anonymous trolls on the internet; it is openly employed 
in the political arena by candidates and political parties, particularly so during the last campaign for 
the general elections. According to Amnesty International Italy, hate speech was exposed consistently 
during the three weeks of monitoring of the electoral campaign. In 23 days, 787 highlightings were 
collected, more than one demeaning or racist or discriminatory message every hour, posted on social 
networks. These messages referred to 129 candidates, 77 of whom were elected, and 43.5 per cent 
were political leaders. They belonged mainly to the League (51 per cent), followed by Fratelli d’Italia 
(“Brothers of Italy”, right wing, 27 per cent), Forza Italia (Centre-right, 13 per cent), CasaPound (far 
right, 4 per cent). 91 per cent of hate declarations referred to asylum seekers and migrants, 32 per 
cent conveyed fake news and counterfeit data, another 37 per cent employed data that were imprecise 
or hard to verify. Facebook (73 per cent) was the social media on which most messages were posted. 
The League was the leading party in this exploitation of the asylum issue. The party is the oldest 
political party in the Italian system. In the past it had important government responsibilities in the 
governments headed by Mr. Berlusconi. It fell into deep crisis between 2011-12, after the collapse of 
the last Berlusconi government and a corruption scandal that involved Mr. Bossi, the historical leader 
of the Northern League, his family and his more faithful co-operators. The party lost many votes in 
local elections and it seemed close to disappearing. But under the new leadership of Matteo Salvini 
it has changed its political message and presented itself as a “new” actor. It has softened its regional 
identity, removing the term “Northern” from the name of the party, and abandoned its traditional 
adversarial language against Rome and Southern Italy, making nationalism its flag. Furthermore, Mr. 
Salvini has established internal connections with leaders of the populist-nationalist right wing: Marine 
Le Pen (Front National) in France, Viktor Orban (Fidesz) in Hungary, Jarosław Kaczyński (PiS) in 
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Poland. In addition, he has repeatedly praised the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the US 
President Donald Trump.   
The hostility against immigrants was a key point of the League’s political message at the outset, but 
under the new leadership it has been emphasized, linking it with sovereignty, security, priority for the 
needs of Italians, strong criticism against the EU and the traditional European partners of Italy. All in 
all, Mr. Salvini has moved the position of his party to the right wing - indeed, in several respects to 
the far right - by connecting populist and anti-establishment arguments with more traditional issues 
of the political (far) right: more freedom to use weapons for private citizens, more resources for the 
police, more emphasis on national borders and interests, lower taxes and fiscal tolerance for 
independent workers. A recent book has defined Salvini’s League as the “far right of government” 
(Passarelli and Tuorto 2018). This message has obtained political success: the League has widened 
its electoral constituency, gaining votes and winning local elections in the Centre and also the South 
of Italy. Recent polls show that more than 30 per cent of Italian electors would vote for the League at 
present, and the League would become the first Italian party.7 
Another actor that has overtly employed an adversarial language against asylum seekers and 
immigrants (the two categories are in general overlapped) is Fratelli d’Italia. It was founded in 2012, 
from a secession of Forza Italia, as a consequence of the decline of that party and of Mr. Berlusconi’s 
leadership. Headed by a young woman, Giorgia Meloni, coming from the traditional Italian right, the 
party has tried to recover the heritage of the old Movimento Sociale-Destra nazionale (the post-fascist 
party of the period 1946-1994), whose symbol appears in the flag of Fratelli d’Italia. Also in this case 
the hostility towards asylum seekers and immigrants has been widely employed to claim the political 
identity of the party, but with less success. This political space is already occupied by the League; 
and Fratelli d’Italia will probably be absorbed by Mr. Salvini’s party.  
                                                          
7 See for instance: http://tg.la7.it/politica/il-sondaggio-politico-di-luned%C3%AC-3-dicembre-2018-03-12-2018-
133769. Accessed on 3 January 2019. 
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A third highly vocal actor in campaigns against the reception of asylum seekers is CasaPound. It was 
established in Rome in 2008, after the occupation of a building that became the first “social centre” 
of the Italian far right. Even if it has competed legally in general elections since 2013 and in some 
local elections, CasaPound is mainly an Italian version of far-right movements. It has squatted several 
buildings in Rome, and it has often been involved in riots with leftist militants and the police. 
Violence is part of its culture, but it has also a pop side, having created a musical group, a theatrical 
company, a web radio. A recent book terms CasaPound “Fascists of the Third Millennium” (Rosati 
2018). The party has been very active in organizing demonstrations against asylum seekers, NGOs 
and also Catholic institutions hosting refugees: something new and unusual in Italian politics. 
To be mentioned is also the convergence among the League, under the leadership of Mr. Salvini, the 
“Fratelli d’Italia” party, and also far right groups such as CasaPound. A party with governmental 
responsibilities, and another party represented in the Italian Parliament, do not hesitate to share 
attitudes, claims, and political actions with the radical right. Reciprocally, in the last general elections 
(March 2018), Simone Di Stefano, leader of CasaPound, made public his support for Salvini and the 
League.8 In May, he expressed his “sympathy” for the new government of the Five Stars Movement-
League coalition. 9 Hence the fight against the reception of asylum seekers has been the opportunity 
for a recomposition of the various segments of the Italian right, with the League (no longer only 
“Northern”) assuming the leadership of that coalition. 
The position of the Five Stars Movement, now the main Italian party, is less clear. In this party 
different positions stay together. As a matter of fact, however, leaders of the movement repeatedly 
took positions against asylum seekers, NGOs and the reception system before the elections, and later 
shared the programme of the League on this issue and voted for its proposals in Parliament. The moral 
leader of the movement, the comedian Beppe Grillo, has on several occasions posted messages 
                                                          
8 https://www.corriere.it/elezioni-2018/notizie/elezioni-2018-casapound-si-sostegno-governo-salvini-ac7b09e2-1b14-
11e8-b6d4-cfc0a9fb6da8.shtml. Accessed on 3 January 2019. 
9 https://www.giornalettismo.com/archives/2661624/casapound-ok-governo-m5s-lega. Accessed on 3 January 2019. 
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against immigrants and asylum seekers on his influential website. Many spokespersons, members of 
Parliament and activists of the movement raise doubts on the NGOs’ role, talking about “taxis of the 
sea”.10 The political leader Luigi Di Maio has published several messages on social media, accusing 
NGOs of being connected with human traffickers11, and spreading suspicion about the “business of 
immigration”12, even if he later denied such accusations. Even recently (April 2019) he emphasized 
“migration policies”, i.e. the harsh closure of Italian borders against asylum seekers, as a key point 
of convergence with the League of Mr. Salvini. 
In more formal terms, the agreement between the Five Stars Movement and the League for the new 
government programme (May 2018), includes a section on immigration, whose title is: “Immigration: 
repatriations and a stop to the business”13. Immigration (but in reality asylum) is described as “an 
unbearable issue for Italy, considering the costs to sustain and the related business”. All the section 
talks of removals, controls, criminal infiltrations, threats to security, detentions, whereas the 
references to human rights are few and marginal. 
The implementation has been even harsher: NGOs ships have been prevented from disembarking 
rescued migrants in Italy, and also a ship of the Italian Coastguard, the Diciotti, was for many days 
refused permission to disembark a group of Eritrean asylum seekers. Only the intervention of the 
Italian Conference of Catholic Bishops (CEI), which took in charge the asylum seekers, resolved the 
situation. 
Only in the last “crisis” (January 2019), when the ships named Sea Watch 3 and Sea Eye were denied 
permission to disembark 39 migrants rescued at sea, did the Prime Minister Conte overtly challenge 
his deputy Prime Minister Salvini, and decided to open the door to 15 migrants, who were taken in 
charge by the Waldensian church. 
                                                          
10 https://thesubmarine.it/2017/04/25/di-maio-ong-razzismo/. Accessed on 4 January 2019. 
11 http://www.vita.it/it/article/2017/04/26/accuse-alle-ong-sui-migranti-un-esempio-lampante-di-post-verita/143141/. 
Accessed on 4 January 2019. 
12 https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2017/04/23/news/di_maio_saviano_ong-163704617/. Accessed on 4 January 2019. 
13 https://www.quotidiano.net/politica/contratto-governo-1.3919012. Accessed on 4 January 2019.  
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4. The opposition of local authorities against the settlement of asylum seekers and reception 
facilities 
 
This national policy reflects also what has happened at local level in recent years. Many local 
governments, after having rejected the invitation to manage a SPRAR project, have protested against 
and tried to resist the settlement of refugees on their territory through  CAS centres, when the Prefects 
identify a suitable facility or a private organization responds to the public tenders for the management 
of such centres.  
The opposition openly targets asylum seekers, and the public policy of reception, even if it often 
fosters a confusion between refugees and other immigrants. For instance, mayors often claim that 
they already host a huge number of immigrants on their territory, and they cannot afford to receive 
other Third Country nationals. 
Second, the policy of reception through CAS centres favours a framing of local policies of exclusion 
in which mayors and municipalities protest against the imposition of refugees by national powers on 
local communities. A frame of contrast between overbearing central powers and peaceful local 
communities, which are obliged to host unknown and dangerous aliens, is recurrent.   
Connected to this is the victim complex: local communities present themselves as the “victims” of an 
“invasion”.  This frame permits the political construction of an opposition between “us”, the peaceful 
and integrated local community, and “them”, the aliens, who are the bearers of danger, insecurity and 
the diminishment of welfare resources. Furthermore, this view promotes the idea that “we” are under 
attack and have the right to defend ourselves, our families, our homes and our properties. Historically, 
this kind of victim complex has triggered the persecution of ethnic and religious minorities:  the 
majority feels itself threated by the presence of aliens, and it depicts its reaction and even the recourse 
to violence as a legitimate defence against this deadly danger. 
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In addition, the local territory is conceived as a private property, or an extension of home. A famous 
slogan of the (Northern) League against immigrants declares “Masters in our own home” (Ambrosini 
2018).  
An important aspect is that the protests have involved many regions and municipalities, and not only 
the Northern regions of Italy, where the anti-immigrant party (Northern) League has its strongholds, 
as occurred in the past with previous waves of local policies of exclusion (Ambrosini 2013). As a 
consequence, more than in the past, also municipalities ruled by centre-left coalitions are involved.  
Following Faist (2002), this could be seen as an example of “symbolic politics” or “meta-politics”, 
in which “real world issues” are connected with “fears around international migration” (ibid., 11-12).  
In particular, “through meta-politics, low-level threats usually gain out-of-proportion significance” 
(ibid., 12). An important aspect is that, by establishing a sharp dichotomy between “us” and “them”, 
local authorities and their supporters in some way recreate a meaning of community, reinforcing the 
bonds between local residents who feel and share a common threat. They find an explanation of and 
an actor responsible for their problems: their impoverishment or economic decline, feelings of 
insecurity, lack of prospects, are connected to the arrival of these unknown aliens. Paradoxically, 
fragmented local communities experience a new sense of unity in protesting against the settlement of 
a few asylum seekers. 
More specifically, a mix of old and new reasons has been employed by local governments in order to 
justify the resistance against the reception of asylum seekers.  A general reason is “inconvenience for 
citizens”, for instance, “the transformation of a green portion of our territory”, and the worries by 
citizens about the numbers (mayor of Bagnolo, province of Brescia, 10 July 2015).14  
Security is obviously a major issue, and it can be expressed in many forms: not only as a fear of 
terrorism or common crimes, but also as a worry about public health.  In a village of the Veneto region 
(Albettone, province of Vicenza) the local council adopted a resolution against the settlement of a 
                                                          
14 http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/sindaco-non-vuole-i-profughi-e-prefetto-deve-arrendersi-1150548.html. 
Accessed on 9 December 2018 
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CAS, demanding that the mayor “protect the community” against “risks connected to the security and 
the possible spread of diseases or plagues”.15  
Another recurrent message is that of the priority of citizens’ needs; a message that traverses the entire 
country and easily obtains consensus in times of crisis and reduced welfare provisions. For instance, 
the mayor of Bagnoli (province of Naples), claimed: “Social conditions would lack. I think that the 
demands of local residents should prevail. It is better to help them in their own country” (4 March 
2017)16.  
Another reason given in many instances by local authorities is that of possible negative consequences 
for the town’s attractiveness to tourism. This is the case of Capalbio, on the Tuscan coast, a well-
known holiday resort for leftist politicians, intellectuals and managers of public companies.  
Here the mayor declared: “We must welcome [asylum seekers], of course. But here there are villas. 
And very luxurious ones. With gardens. Finely furnished. In the historic centre” (14 August 2016). 
Some intellectuals and affluent holidaymakers supported this position more or less overtly.17  
The mayor of Positano, a village on the beautiful Amalfi coast, has expressed a similar reason: "The 
reception [of asylum seekers] is not compatible with our distinctive features. This is not racism, but 
protection of a place, and there are also reasons of public order and security” (22 February 2017).18 
Local authorities do not limit themselves to declarations and verbal protests. In Saronno, Lombardy, 
at town with 40,000 inhabitants, in October 2016 the mayor managed to block the opening of a 
reception centre for 32 asylum seekers. The property (a former school) belonged to a congregation of 
nuns and was restructured with significant expenditure by the catholic organization Caritas 
Ambrosiana, following a request by the Prefect. The mayor employed legal impediments to deny the 
transformation of the school into a reception centre, but his motivations were made clear by his 
                                                          
15repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/07/20/un-muro-in-paese-per-bloccare-i-rifugiati-lultima-
sceriffo14.html. Accessed on 9 December 2018. 
16 http://www.palazzotenta39.it/public/rifugiati-a-bagnoli-il-no-e-i-dubbi-del-sindaco/. Accessed on 9 December 2018. 
17 http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/08/14/capalbio-larrivo-di-50-profughi-fa-discutere-la-sinistra-alcuni-territori-
sono-speciali-le-accuse-ipocriti-radical-chic/2974710/. Accessed on 10 December 2018. 
18 http://www.caprinews.it/leggi1.asp?cod=8084. Accessed on 10 December 2018. 
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declarations: “The citizens of Saronno do not want clandestines, and national sovereignty belongs to 
the citizens of Saronno, not to the refugees (…) It is an administrative act, not a political one. Anyway, 
citizens who elected me demand me to do it. When they meet me in the street, the huge majority insist 
that I remain firm on asylum seekers”19. In another interview, he declared: “I do not want African 
males in proximity to schools attended by our girls”.20 
As in other cases, there also local actors who dissent. In Saronno a network of associations, “Quattro 
passi di pace” (“Four steps of peace”) mobilized in favour of the reception centre, but without 
achieving the purpose of changing the mind of the local administration. What they obtained was a 
condemnation of the League (10,000  euros, as well as 4,000 euros of legal expenses) for having 
described as “clandestines” the 32 asylum seekers to be hosted, in posters that they exposed in the 
town.21 
A radicalization of the fight against the settlement of reception centres for asylum seekers was 
expressed also by the resolution adopted in August 2017 by the mayor (League) of San Germano 
Vercellese, a small town in Piedmont, which obtained wide coverage in the national press and in the 
political debate. The mayor wrote literally, in the title of the resolution adopted by the municipal 
council of “Protection of the territory against invasion/immigration by populations coming from 
Africa and not only”22. She threatened with fines (from 150 to 5,000 euros) people who rent out 
properties to host asylum seekers, including non-profit and religious organizations. The resolution 
explains the reasons: “It is not possible to tolerate that the authority of the Mayor elected by citizens 
is trespassed as regards the hospitality of migrants; that the hospitality, given hypocritically and at all 
costs, has an end dumping on the shoulders, on the budget and on the responsibility of municipalities 
                                                          
19https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/10/01/migranti-sindaco-leghista-blocca-il-centro-accoglienza-delle-suore-ma-
non-ha-fatto-i-conti-con-il-viminale/3067047/. Accessed on 29 December 2018. 
20 https://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/02/23/news/clandestini_lega_condanna_discriminazione_profughi-
158956059/. Accessed on 29 December 2018. 
21 https://milano.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/17_febbraio_23/lega-condannata-discriminazione-profughi-non-sono-
clandestini-949736fa-f9b1-11e6-9b43-a08eac6546a0.shtml. Accessed on 29 December 2019. 
22 http://www.vita.it/it/article/2017/08/29/la-delibera-del-comune-che-si-tutela-dallinvasione-delle-popolazioni-
a/144335/ . Accessed on 5 January 2019. 
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(especially the small ones) the presence of hundreds of people who are alien to the local context and 
who, after a few months, will come to knock on the Mayor’s door to demand assistance which very 
probably it will not be possible to provide.”  The regional ombudsman of Piedmont wrote a letter 
inviting the Mayor to revoke the resolution, but she refused, saying that she did not even read the 
letter and that she was proud to have prevented the settlement of reception centres in her municipality.  
A different type of conflict occurred in Ventimiglia, a key transit point on the border with France. 
Here hundreds of asylum seekers arrived, after having landed in Southern Italy, with the purpose of 
crossing the border and applying for asylum in France. French authorities enforced the border, and 
asylum seekers were blocked. Some of them were assisted in a Red Cross camp, others by the local 
Caritas, but many others remained without any shelter, living and sleeping outdoors along the River 
Roja. No borders’ movements and other activists came to support them, providing tents and some 
food: an informal camp grew, a situation similar to other border zones, such as the so-called Jungle 
of Calais (Sandri 2018). After some months, the residents began to protest, and in August 2016, in 
the peak period of the tourist season, the local mayor (Democratic Party, centre-left) issued an 
ordinance forbidding the distribution of food outside the Red Cross camp or the Caritas facilities.23 
While covered by alleged hygienic reasons, the meaning of the ordinance became clear when the 
public fountains near the train station were closed. Some activists were fined for having infringed the 
ban. This disposition lasted some months, raising many protests, by Amnesty International, MSF, 
Caritas, among others. A public demonstration in Ventimiglia was announced.  At that point, in April 
2017 the mayor withdrew the ordinance.24 
Only in some cases have the inhabitants mobilized against asylum seekers spontaneously. A relevant 
case is that of Gorino, a hamlet with about 600 inhabitants in the province of Ferrara (region of 
Emilia-Romagna), with a long-standing leftist tradition. Here in October 2016 about one hundred 
                                                          
23 http://www.ansa.it/liguria/notizie/2016/08/12/ventimiglia-stop-a-cibo-non-autorizzato_1f8c7a35-78fa-435d-8ce1-
b4fc1dfdb2a7.html. Accessed on 5 January 2019. 
24https://genova.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/04/23/news/ventimiglia_revocato_il_divieto_di_distribuire_cibo_ai_migrant
i-163684319/. Accessed on 5 January 2019. 
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residents blocked with barricades the three accesses to the hamlet, protesting against the settlement 
of 12 refugee women with eight children in a local hostel, in which five rooms had been requisitioned 
by the Prefect. The coach with the women was forced to go back, the Prefect had to change his 
decision, and the refugees were hosted in other facilities of the province. The political parties were 
apparently not involved at the beginning, but immediately afterwards the right wing supported the 
protest. The local secretary of the League spoke of “new heroes of the Resistance against the 
dictatorship of reception”, while the mayor (Democratic Party) expressed understanding for “the fear 
of citizens”25. At the general elections of March 2018, the League achieved locally 43 per cent of 
votes in the Lower Chamber, the centre-right 68 per cent.26 
 
5. The far right and the mobilizations against asylum seekers 
 
Protests by local authorities and mobilizations of far-right movements intersect and support each 
other. Castelli Gattinara (2017) has analysed the political discourse of such movements, highlighting 
some key points. In general, far-right movements build their identity ex negativo, targeting a set of 
enemies and distinguishing between friends and foes.  While in the past they emphasized racial 
superiority or inferiority, now they focus on “incompatibility”, reframing heir racism in cultural, 
rather than biological terms. Furthermore, they present themselves as the defenders of traditional 
(Christian) European values against Islam as the historical enemy of the European civilization. 
Consequently, they act upon a loyalty to liberal values and democracy, as a way to reject the demand 
for basic rights by Muslims and asylum seekers.  
Beyond this general framework, in the case of asylum seekers in Italy the far-right discourse refers to 
other arguments that can attract broader consensus, even “invading the linguistic territory of their 
                                                          
25 http://temi.repubblica.it/micromega-online/le-barricate-caserecce-di-gorino-e-gli-imprenditori-politici-del-razzismo/ . 
Accessed on 5 January 2019. 
26 https://www.ilrestodelcarlino.it/ferrara/politica/elezioni-4-marzo-risultati-gorino-1.3769292. Accessed on 5 January 
2019. 
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opponents” (ibid.: 87). Some examples follow: the need to respect the human rights of refugees; 
accusing aid organizations of hosting asylum seekers in degraded facilities; “fake solidarity”; 
corruption in the third sector; the infiltration of private interests in reception activities; the accusation 
of “fake refugees”, or disguised “economic migrants” to exploit the asylum system. Overall, “the idea 
is that corrupt NGOs, the mass media, and multiculturalist elites have strategically constructed the 
concept of ‘refugee crisis’ to generate a moral panic, softening public opinion and legitimizing the 
‘invasion’ of Italy by economic migrants” (ibid.: 88)  
An example of the mobilization of far-right groups, together with local residents and elected 
authorities, occurred near Verona. Here in 2017 an anti-immigrant movement (“Verona ai Veronesi”, 
“Verona to its citizens”), for many days and nights surrounded a reception centre in which 25 asylum 
seekers were hosted, insulted and intimidated refugees and social workers, damaged properties, 
without any intervention by public authorities. Some mayors in the area, including the mayor of the 
village of Roncolevà in which the reception centre was located, supported the protest. On the other 
side, a network (“Verona che dialoga”, “Dialoguing Verona”), in which about 100 local associations 
took part, mobilized (July 2017). Pro-immigrant associations  threatened to boycott the products of  
a firm which backed the protest, offering logistical support, and declared: “We also ask those who 
have the responsibility, first the Prefecture, which is responsible for the reception, to put an end to 
such acts of violence and to prevent new ones, and to engage seriously in an appropriate management 
of reception which protects the rights of all”.27   
The opposition against asylum seekers and the establishment of reception centres has often been a 
source of legitimization for far-right movements, such as CasaPound.  They could demonstrate 
together with local residents and sometimes also with mayors, finding support for their rallies, traffic 
blocks and riots, as happened in Casale San Nicola, a neighbourhood of Rome28.  
                                                          
27 http://www.radiopopolareverona.com/old/?q=content/fermare-subito-la-violenza-razzista. Accessed on 10 January 
2019. 
28 https://www.leggo.it/news/roma/roma_protesta_casale_san_nicola_casapound_immigrati-1148232.html. Accessed on 
10 January 2019. 
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Another relevant example is provided by Spinetoli, a little town (about 7,000 inhabitants) in the region 
of Marche, with a leftist tradition. Here the mayor (Democratic Party, centre-left) in November 2017 
demonstrated together with the League and CasaPound against the establishment of a CAS centre, 
hosting 37 people. The mayor called them “an enormous number”29. About 300 people took part in a 
torchlight demonstration. Then CasaPound distanced itself from the mayor, leaving the hall during 
his speech. Before the arrival of the asylum seekers, the house in which they would have to reside 
was burnt. The police never found the authors of the crime. 
As in other countries, the issue of asylum has been the opportunity for the radical right to find a new 
political space, to reach a larger public and to acquire new supporters. 
A report by Lunaria, an anti-racist organization, has highlighted this convergence, and underlined the 
resonance that such demonstrations have achieved through the social media. 
 
While initially the extreme right-wing and the Northern League operated in substantial autonomy and at local 
level, carrying out single actions and events with few participants, eventually their initiatives became 
structured in a more organized and transversal manner, linking to spontaneous protests on the territory, also 
thanks to the use of social media. On many occasions, political groups have joined emerging committees 
organizing against the reception of refugees. Nocturnal raids, daytime assemblies, demonstrations and street 
protests, have been amplified thanks to the increasingly frequent use of “virtual squares” (Lunaria 2017: 65). 
 
There were relatively few participants in the demonstrations, even if sometimes in small villages a 
substantial part of the population was involved; but the audience they reached, through new and 
traditional media, was much wider.  
 
                                                          
29 http://www.osservatoriorepressione.info/spinetoli-ap-sindaco-pd-sfila-casapound-linvasione-37-profughi/. Accessed 
on 10 January 2019 
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6. Mobilizations and initiatives in favour of refugees 
As already observed, protests and mobilizations against reception centres and asylum seekers have 
not only met consensus from public opinion; they have also been an opportunity of activism and  
visibility for a multi-coloured set of pro-immigrant actors, ranging from the radical left of the social 
movements, No-borders type, to Catholic institutions: an advocacy coalition that recalls the “strange 
bedfellows” identified by Zolberg (2006) in US immigration policy.. 
Here four main categories of actors can be distinguished. First, NGOs, or Third Sector Organizations 
(TSOs), which provide services to migrants and asylum seekers in mainly professional ways, and 
often in agreement with public bodies. This is the case of SPRARs and CASs, which are mainly 
managed by NGOs receiving government funds. But, in other cases, as in the dispute on NGOs 
rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean Sea, they can act with some independence from public 
policies, and even against the will of governments.  
Second, we can identify other organised actors, including trade unions, churches and associations, 
which often combine practical support with political and cultural activity. They employ professionals 
but also many volunteers. They can cooperate with public powers but also act beyond the law, for 
instance by providing help to people with a dubious or irregular legal status (for a comparison with 
the US, see Hagan 2008). This side of their activity is likely to grow, as a consequence of the new 
rules on asylum which will very probably create a huge amount of migrants remaining in Italy without 
legal status. The activism of civil society in favour of immigrants has been a constant feature of Italy’s 
experience as an immigrant receiving country: many gaps in the provision of services to immigrants 
are filled in various ways by non-state actors (Ambrosini and Van der Leun 2015). The new issue of 
asylum seekers has reaffirmed this long-standing aspect.  
Third, there are social movements, which place the defence of immigrant rights alongside other 
battles against the state and the capitalist system. However, they provide also more and concrete 
services to migrants and asylum seekers: what Zamponi (2017) has called “direct social actions”, 
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defining them as “actions that do not primarily focus upon claiming something from the state or other 
power-holders but that instead focus upon directly transforming some specific aspects of society by 
means of the action itself” (ibid.: 97). The difference between these activities and more traditional 
forms of volunteering is an issue under discussion, but to be stressed is the connection between 
political protest and practical support to asylum seekers. 
Fourth, there are support groups that spontaneously coalesce, especially around refugees settled in 
particular localities, for instance providing help for people in transit at the railway station of Milan, 
or in the border zone of Ventimiglia-Val Roja (Giliberti 2017); or organizing sport and leisure 
activities at reception centres. In this category, individuals who offer specific assistance with food, 
money and accommodation (Fontanari and Ambrosini 2018), or language lessons may be considered 
as well, integrating those provided by law in reception centres. 
As regards the forms of support that such actors develop, it is possible to identify four types of 
activity. The first can be labelled “networking”: as in the cases presented above, mainly at local level 
but not only, pro-refugees groups try to connect, mitigating their differences, sign joint pleas, in some 
cases integrate their services. 
A second relevant aspect concerns assistance with legal procedures.  Often through volunteer lawyers, 
many pro-refugee actors help people in compiling their applications for asylum or appeals against a 
refusal. An extension of this activity consists in pro-bono legal advocacy for both civil and criminal 
matters, which is often provided, in the Italian case, by associations of socially committed lawyers.   
A third and crucial type of activity is the provision of services, particularly educational and social 
welfare services, such as language courses, basic health services, clothing, food, and shelters for the 
homeless; a category in which many rejected asylum seekers, but also recognized refugees, fall.  
These services are mainly supplied by volunteers and are often funded by private donations along 
with support from other social institutions. Overall, these activities provide what Leerkes (2016) in 
the Netherlands has called “secondary poor relief” and Belloni (2016) describes more positively as 
“welfare from below”. Another type of service is the provision of moral support by some civil society 
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actors, particularly faith groups (for a comparison with the British case, see Bloch, Sigona and Zetter 
2014). 
Fourth, there are activities associated with political and cultural opposition to the criminalization of 
asylum seekers, protest activities against policies of exclusion, support for the free movement of 
asylum seekers, and the promotion of views alternative to dominant representations of the issue. 
These actors have tried to influence public opinion by organizing many conferences and debates at 
local level. They have not obtained much success, in political terms, but they have succeeded in 
reinforcing the opposition against xenophobic policies and in showing that active minorities do not 
share the xenophobic policies of the present political majority. 
The typology in Table 3 also describes for each category of supporters the level of political 
engagement, the degree of formalization of the various actors and activities, and the kind of human 
resources committed (if professional or volunteer). 
 
Table 3 Typology of supporters to asylum seekers and migrants in irregular condition  
 NGOs and 
specialized 
organizations 
Other CSOs 
(associations of 
volunteers, 
churches, trade 
unions…) 
Social movements Citizens  
Main activities SAR in the sea 
Reception on the 
territory 
Language schools;  
Medical services; 
Legal advocacy; 
Bureaucratic 
assistance; 
Provision of basic 
assistance: bed and 
food 
Political protest, but 
increasingly 
provision of services 
(e.g. accommodation 
in squatted buildings; 
legal and 
bureaucratic 
assistance; leisure 
activities) 
Donation of food, 
clothes, money;  
Italian language 
lessons 
Leisure and 
socialization 
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Political engagement Variable, higher 
recently against 
harsher closure of 
borders 
Variable, but 
increasingly coupled 
with the provision of 
services 
Main focus (No 
Borders movements) 
Variable, often 
relevant as the 
reason to mobilise 
Formalization  High (formal 
organizations, 
contracts with public 
authorities) 
Mix of formal 
structures, 
volunteering and 
informal activities 
Low, but self-
organization 
Low (spontaneous 
mobilization) 
Human resources Mainly professionals, 
volunteers as 
supplementary 
resources 
Variable, but often 
volunteering is 
relevant 
Militants/volunteers  Only volunteers 
 
  
7. Three examples of pro-refugee mobilizations 
 
A number of civil society actors have launched innovative initiatives of refugees’ reception. Two of 
them warrant particular mention: a scheme for domestic hospitality of refugees in Italian families and 
the project of the so-called “humanitarian corridors”. As regards domestic hospitality, this was 
introduced for the first time in 2008 in Turin within the SPRAR project and since 2015, it has been 
implemented in other cities, especially in the North and Centre of Italy (Campomori and Feraco 2018; 
Marchetti 2018).  
 These schemes display differences in their actual implementation as regards the economic 
contribution that the families receive or the length of the project.  A common denominator, however, 
is apparent: on the one hand, it is believed that a (temporary) stay of refugees in a family –including 
the possibility of sharing the family’s relational resources - could enable the building of networks 
useful for both labour market and social integration. On the other hand, these projects try to achieve 
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a cultural purpose: they gamble on the idea that the example given by the hosting families could 
contribute to reducing people’s prejudices and fear related to immigrants and refugees and in 
generating trust at the local level.  
As regards the results, the Refugees Welcome Italia network (the national branch of a wide European 
network) has promoted 120 experiences of familial reception (January 2018), in 18 Italian towns, 
mainly located in the Centre-North of Italy. Almost 1,200 Italian households have registered their 
willingness to welcome a refugee on the website of the association. Caritas Italiana in turn, through 
the project “Protetto. Rifugiato a casa mia” (“Protected. Refugee in my home”) has hosted 118 
refugees in Italian households, in various Italian cities.  Furthermore, 218 refugees have been hosted 
in parishes, 72 in religious institutes. Almost 300 have been provided with autonomous 
accommodations, but in any case, a local family, named “tutor-family” has been entrusted with the 
task of following the refugees, giving them information, advice and support (Marchetti 2018). 
While positive feedbacks have emerged in relation to the integration objectives, the number of 
refugees hosted in these projects is still low, in comparison with the size of the country and the number 
of asylum seekers.  Another weakness is the relation between public and private actors: in the case of 
Caritas Italiana (and partially the Refugees Welcome Italia network), no official relations are 
envisaged; while in other cases the project is officially part of a SPRAR or CAS. 
The second relevant practice - humanitarian corridors - aims at innovating both asylum policies and 
asylum seeker integration. Human corridors organize the arrival of people in need of humanitarian 
protection from the regions of immediate reception at the borders of war zones. Asylum seekers 
receive a permit and they can reach a safe country through regular flights, without dangerous journeys 
and profits for human smugglers. In Italy humanitarian corridors started at the end of 2015 after the 
signing of an agreement among the catholic S. Egidio community, the Evangelical Churches 
Federation, the Waldensian Church and the Italian government. Around 1017 persons arrived safely 
in Italy through these corridors from Lebanon. In 2017 another corridor opened from Ethiopia, 
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promoted by the Catholic Church (Caritas, Fondazione Migrantes and S.Egidio community), and 500 
persons legally entered Italy (January 2019).30  
After their arrival, asylum seekers are hosted in parishes, religious institutes or apartments in various 
towns and regions, according to the idea of a “scattered reception”. They follow a 12-month 
integration process entirely funded by the private actors who have promoted the project, with the 
support of volunteers. In particular, in the second case (humanitarian corridor from Ethiopia) every 
asylum seeker or family is accompanied by the “tutor-family” cited above, in acquiring knowledge 
of the local society, accessing services, attending Italian language courses, building social networks, 
looking for employment.  
This is a clear example of the activism of civil society in accordance with the state. France and 
Belgium have followed the example, signing similar agreements with religious actors. 
Notwithstanding the strong innovative potential for asylum policies, also for humanitarian corridors 
some critical issues emerge, such as the actual time required for integration (12 months may not be 
enough for every person) and the difficult balance between the need to support these persons and the 
need to foster their autonomy. Moreover, the selection of beneficiaries is a process that raises many 
dilemmas related, for instance, to who takes responsibility for choosing the beneficiaries, and to the 
categories of people who should be given priority: the most vulnerable persons or those with a higher 
potential to enter the labour market.31 
The third relevant initiative has emphasized the political character of the movement. A large 
demonstration “Insieme senza muri” (“Together without walls”) took place in Milan in May 2017, 
with the participation of 80,000-100,000 people. On that occasion, diverse components of the pro-
immigrant front took to the streets: political forces, associations, social movements, people who work 
in services to immigrants. Nevertheless, what many observers emphasized was that also many 
immigrants were involved, probably for the first time. Among the speakers were the President of the 
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 Conversation with Daniele Albanese, Caritas italiana 
31 Conversation with Paolo Naso, head of “Mediterranean Hope”, Waldensian Church 
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High Chamber and the Mayor of Milan (Democratic Party), while the promoter was the local 
councillor for Social Policies (Democratic Party)32. Furthermore, “Insieme senza muri” has become a 
permanent label, giving life to a month of events held once a year: meetings, debates, festivals.  
Milan is at present the only large Italian city ruled by the Centre-Left, and tries to give an image of 
open and welcoming city to refugees and immigrants. In the presentation of the programme of events 
for “Insieme senza muri” 2018, the local administration claims: Milan is “a metropolis integrating 
through work, knowledge, the will to get busy. As a consequence, Milan is a city without walls (…). 
A city which wants to continue to be a capital of rights and of the construction of a new culture of 
citizenship”.33 
 
8. Conclusions. How the “refugee crisis” is changing Italian politics 
 
Italy is a significant case in the European landscape of refugee policies for two main reasons. First, it 
has faced the so-called “refugee crisis” with growing difficulties and anxiety (see Van Hootegem and 
Meuleman 2019). The establishment of the “hotspots”, as required by the EU has been a turning point, 
also because the enactment of tighter controls at the Alpine borders by the neighbouring states 
followed the new regulation. The Italian government was compelled to abandon its traditional, albeit 
implicit, policy of allowing the transit of the asylum seekers towards North-Western Europe. 
Not only was Italy closely involved in search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea, but it 
also had to increase rapidly its commitment to asylum seekers’ reception on the national territory. 
The Italian system of asylum was not adequate, and extraordinary solutions became necessary, under 
the label of a permanent emergency.  Last but not least, all this occurred in a period of deep financial 
                                                          
32 https://milano.corriere.it/cronaca/diretta-live/17_maggio_20/marcia-milano-dell-accoglienza-in-piazza-saremo-oltre-
diecimila-aa10b920-3d4f-11e7-a425-2bf1a959c761.shtml. Accessed on 12 January 2019. 
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and economic crisis, when the government was obliged to cut social expenditure, to raise the age of 
retirement, and to deal with growing unemployment. 
The second aspect concerns the cultural and political consequences of this unexpected entanglement 
in the refugee issue. Most Italians were convinced that they were being invaded by asylum seekers 
coming from Africa by sea. Anti-establishment and xenophobic political forces reached a wide 
audience, spreading fears and accusations against asylum seekers, the NGOs rescuing them, and the 
cooperatives providing reception services. Local authorities played a key role. After in most cases 
having refused to take part voluntarily in the ordinary reception system (SPRAR), they often protested 
against the establishment of extraordinary reception centres (CAS) by the Prefects.  
The final act was the electoral victory of anti-establishment parties in the general elections of March 
2018. Italy has become the first large country of Western Europe with a populist government. In the 
electoral campaign, in the government agreement, and in the following actions the new political 
majority has taken vocal anti-refugee positions, denying access to Italian ports to NGOs ships, 
disputing with the traditional European partners, expressing support for the Visegrad group, rejecting 
the signature of the Global Compact for Migrations.  The landmark of the new approach has been the 
approval of a new bill under the label of “Security package”. This new law almost completely 
abolishes “humanitarian protection”; excludes asylum seekers from the SPRAR; sharply reduces the 
services provided by the CAS; and transfers European funds addressed to policies for integration to 
that of deportations.  
This hardening of asylum policies appears to be supported by the majority of Italian citizens at 
present, according to several polls.  The xenophobic League, after shifting to a far-right position, 
experienced a sharp increase in virtual preferences by the interviewees  (more than 30 per cent at 
present), and its leader Mr. Salvini enjoys much popularity. 
This trend, however, does not go without opposition. Civil society is at the forefront, whereas the 
political opposition, after the serious defeat in the general election, is struggling to find a new identity. 
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As highlighted in this chapter, the activities developed by the civil society in favour of refugees are 
manifold, ranging from political protest to the provision of services.  
According to many observers, the main opponent of the Italian government in the field of migration 
policies is the Catholic Church headed by Pope Francis. The issue is in fact more complex, because 
also within the Catholic Church many participants and also a part of the clergy share a restrictive 
approach. 
The analysis leads to two final observations. First, the restrictions enacted by the State are giving 
more space to alternative providers of services. This is the case of refugees who are legally authorised 
to reside in Italy, but do not receive any assistance; of rejected asylum seekers, now growing in 
numbers as a consequence of the new legislation, but still remaining in Italy. It is also the case of 
humanitarian corridors allowing the entrance of asylum seekers; and even the case of new arrivals by 
sea, when the hospitality supplied by religious actors has by-passed the opposition by the government. 
Second, the radicalisation of the struggle on asylum and migration policies is giving a political 
meaning also to ordinary actions of help and support. Anti-immigrant groups contest NGOs rescuing 
people at sea, cooperatives managing reception facilities and religious institutions hosting asylum 
seekers. On the other side, social movements now provide various concrete services to asylum 
seekers; social workers take part in demonstrations together with political activists; and volunteers 
claim the political significance of their activity.  
Immigration and asylum are crucial issues in the present political debate in Italy. They are defining 
political and cultural identities, fostering militancy and social engagement, generating new actors and 
changing the attitudes of the established ones. It is not certain that this is the best way to find 
pragmatic solutions to the problems at stake, but there is no doubt that Italian politics and society 
have changed as a consequence of the so-called “refugee crisis”. 
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